The catchup and convergence of developing economies with the Western world is a major experience in modern history. In this paper we explore the role played jointly by technological imitation and trade liberalization in a North-South endogenous growth model. We prove that a gradual trade liberalization between South and North will promote convergence at any level of initial trade costs if the Southern economies are fully industrialized, their R&D potential is relatively low and the elasticity of substitution among manufactures is high enough.
Introduction and Related Literature
Empirically the patterns of North-South trade show a division of world production where the North keeps the production of new, unstandardized manufactures while relegating the South to making standardized, older products at lower cost. The pioneering study of Vernon (1966) and the followup literature on product cycles analysis shed a lot of light in understanding such patterns of trade and technology transfer. Krugman (1979) advanced a seminal exogenous growth model, describing the determinants of international convergence as a function of the strength of innovation in the North and technological imitation in the South. His work allowed Grossman and Helpman (1991, henceforth GH) , Lai (1995) or Chui et al. (2001) to endogenize the forces leading to such innovation and imitation rates. Over time, the literature on endogenous product cycles has further extended GH's model. For instance, Mondal (2008) undertook a local stability analysis of the steady states in GH. The realities of FDI and world migration were incorporated as determinants of product cycles and technology transfer in that the economies were either autarkic or trade was perfectly free. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2006) , Cristobal Campoamor (2009) and Gusta¤son and Segerstrom (2010) showed that trade liberalization was potentially important for North-South convergence in a product cycle setting. But these authors evaluated the e¤ect of a marginal rise in trade openness on real convergence, once trade openness was almost complete to start with. In this paper we attempt to …ll this gap by generalizing the conditions for real-wage convergence, since we allow for any possible initial level of trade openness. In particular, we prove that the convergence phenomenon arises if the size and R&D productivity of the North is su¢ ciently large, relative to the South, and the elasticity of substitution among manufactures is high enough.
Environment 2.1 Endowments
As in GH (1991), we consider two countries: North and South. The population of both countries is exogenously given (being L s for the South and L n for the North). There are three productive factors:
labor, researchers and …nancial capital. Labor is employed in manufacturing, whereas researchers are employed in a competitive R&D sector.
Given the assumed Northern comparative advantage to innovate, researchers in the North are used to conceive new varieties; researchers in the South can only replicate the existing ones to produce them in the South at lower cost.
Preferences
Any representative household living in location k maximizes, in every period t, an intertemporal utility function W k t such as
This function shows the discounted utility ‡ow that the household k expects to obtain from period t onwards by acquiring manufactures, grouped into the composite X. The composite of manufactures X s is a Dixit-Stiglitz subutility function over the aggregate mass of varieties invented up to period s.
where 0 < < 1 is a direct measure of the substitutability between varieties and x j (s) quanti…es the household demand for variety j at time s. These preferences imply an appreciation of manufacturing diversity, since utility grows as a given expenditure is more thinly split into an increasing number of varieties.
Technologies
In the global economy there is a continuum of industrial varieties with measure n, and n = n n + n s (the sum of the Northern and Southern masses of varieties). The degree of product variety expands over time due to innovation. Moreover, an increase in the measure of manufactures enlarges the stock of public knowledge and reduces future R&D costs. GH's local stocks of public knowledge are equal to n in the North, since all patents were originally made up there, and n s in the South.
The production function for every particular manufacture is identical and very simple: one unit of labor produces one unit of …nal output. Prior to the production of any manufacture it is necessary to incur a …xed cost to invent or imitate the corresponding patent. By perfect competition and free entry in the innovative and imitative activities, such a …xed cost is at least equal to the market value of the patent. This value decreases with the local stock of public knowledge as follows:
v s asws ns ; with equality when _ n s > 0 v n anwn n ; with equality when _ n > 0
where v s and v n denote the values of Southern and Northern patents, respectively.
as ns and an n stand for the number of researchers needed to imitate a Northern patent in the South and to create a new variety in the North. Our variables w s and w n denote the nominal wage in the South and the North, respectively. Consequently, when both innovation and imitation are active we can conclude that
Southern researchers need to incur the previous …xed cost in order to replicate a Northern patent, while Northern researchers do it to invent one from scratch. On the other hand, we assume that our parameter 1 introduces the classical iceberg notion of trade costs for manufactures: it is necessary to buy units of the good abroad to consume one unit at home.
Static optimization
Productive …rms must decide which price to quote in every period to maximize pro…ts. On the other hand, consumers in any location not only decide how much to save, which equity to buy and which varieties to consume, but also choose their job: they become either manufacturing workers or researchers.
The function W k s is intertemporally maximized with respect to its ultimate arguments (x j (s), 8j, 8s t) at every period t, taking as given the expected temporal paths of v n (s), v s (s), n, n s , p j (s) 8j 8s t. This problem can be decomposed into two parts:
-The static allocation of a given per-household expenditure E k (s) among all kind of manufactures, which gives rise to a demand function for each of these commodities.
-The choice of an optimal path for E k (s), given the possibility of saving and investing in equity of Northern and Southern …rms.
Let us denote by E the aggregate world expenditure and by E n and E s the part spent by people from the North and the South, respectively, which are endogenous variables. Considering that the demand for any variety comes from both Northern and Southern consumers who face di¤erent c.i.f. prices, we can derive the aggregate demand for any Northern (x n ) and Southern manufacture (x s ), taking into account (1) and (2) as follows: Firms maximize pro…ts at any period s taking into account a demand of the type (5) or (6) and the simple production function described above. As a result, both utility and pro…t maximization from expressions (2), (5) and (6) Under perfect international mobility of …nancial capital, our dynamic optimization problem leads to the following non arbitrage condition, to be satis…ed period by period:
In order to characterize below our dynamical system, we also need to follow the evolution of the aggregate mass of manufactures in the South and in the global economy ( _ ns ns and _ n n ), whose path will be determined by the labor market clearing conditions in both countries:
Our key endogenous variables
We are going to group our set of endogenous variables into three key ratios, which will be constant in the steady state of our dynamical system. Let us de…ne now these three basic endogenous variables (b; c and d):
It will also be useful to de…ne the Southern relative wage as ! 3 North-South convergence analysis of the wide gap case
The wide gap case is a situation in which the Southern …rms can quote their unconstrained markup ws in both markets. This happens because the Southern equilibrium wage is so low that any potential Northern competitor will never try to undercut the Southern …rms. More speci…cally, from now on we will only consider the case in which Lai (1995; 2008) argues that this is a reasonable assumption, given the international patterns of income disparity between the West and less developed countries.
Derivation of our system of di¤erential equations
First of all, we are going to solve for the share of Northern expenditure En E . That will help us obtain the system of di¤erential equations in terms of our three endogenous variables and the parameters of the model: L n ; L s , a n , a s , , and . (2008), we will use a trade balance condition in both countries. Such balance implies that
As in Mondal
That is, the local value of production must be equal to the local value of expenditure in both locations.
Let us now denote by q the following endogenous variable:
After plugging (11) into (5), considering (10) and rearranging, we are …nally able to get that
The dynamics of the system will be explored by solving for n vn , s vs , n n x n and n s x s in terms of b, c and d. If we consider our expression (4) and use the labor market clearing conditions in (8), from (7) and (12) it is possible to derive a 3x3 dynamical system of nonlinear di¤erential equations as follows:
Obtaining this system paves the way to possible extensions of our work. In this paper we will limit ourselves to some steady-state analysis; however, it is possible to explore the local and global stability of the system. Another very interesting task would be evaluating the welfare implications of trade liberalization for both the Northern and Southern representative consumers. That would also require the analyisis of the transitional dynamics.
Convergence e¤ects of trade liberalization in steady state
It is already possible to solve for the steady state values of our three endogenous variables: b ; c and d . By setting the left-hand side of our three di¤erential equations equal to zero, it is straightforward to come up with: 
Obtaining the ratio of w s over w n ,
where
As we can observe in (14), both nominal wages depend in steady state on the level of trade openness.
Nevertheless, the local shares of varieties are not a¤ected by any trade liberalization. The steadystate growth rate would not su¤er any modi…cation either. Notice that our comparative statics exercise will gain in predictability if there exists a unique steady-state for the system under the wide gap case. Such condition will be guaranteed by the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.There exists a unique steady state equilibrium in our North-South economy under costly trade.
Proof. The right hand side of (15) is positive and strictly decreasing in !, going to zero as ! tends to in…nity and to in…nity as ! tends to zero. Therefore, the continuous and di¤erentiable
(1+ q) has a unique …xed point. That means the steady state equilibrium exists and is also unique.
We will introduce now an auxiliary lemma that will be useful to derive our Proposition 1 below.
Lemma 2. Let us consider the following equation, which de…nes an implicit function for q:
. We claim that q > (<) 1 if and only if
Proof. See the Appendix.
We are already able to obtain our main results, spelled out in Propositions 1 and 2. Such condition does not depend on the level of initial trade costs.
Proof. Let us now denote by
. Using the implicit function in (15) and our de…nition in (11), it is possible to di¤erentiate and get that, over the steady state,
This last expression involves that higher trade openness will increase (decrease) the Southern relative wage only if q is lower (higher) than one. Since the expressions (11) and (15) need to hold, we can derive the following expression:
We know from Lemma 2 that q > (<) 1 if and only if
By (16), (17) and our last condition in (19), we can conclude that our nominal, relative wage ! will be increasing (decreasing) in if and only if 
But we should pay attention to the ratio of real wages as well, taking the local price indices into account. The Southern and Northern price indices (I s and I n ) are given by the following well known expressions:
We know that the local real wage is equivalent to the indirect utility. Therefore, after some simpli…cations, we can see that
Proposition 2. It is possible to check that ! R will also be increasing in if and only if q < 1.
That implies that our crucial condition (20) will be necessary and su¢ cient for real convergence as well.
In expression (20) we can see that ! is more likely to be positive the higher is the innovative potential in the North and the lower is the imitative capacity in the South. The R&D potential in each block will be determined by the population employed in the research sector and the R&D costs.
That is true because, as the size and productivity of the R&D sector in the North increases, the Northern share of world manufactures will grow and more world demand will be channeled to the North. That will increase the demand for labor in the North and the aggregate Northern income.
Once trade openness rises, initially there would be an upward swing in the net exports of the South, since the aggregate income of the North is higher and imports become more attractive in both countries. In fact, all Southern and Northern consumers will increase their imports by the same percentage.
However, the trade balance condition means that net exports are always equal to zero in both countries and, therefore, local wages need to adjust in favor of the South. As we can observe in (20), this is only possible if is high enough. Otherwise the aggregate expenditure on imports would not increase su¢ ciently.
For instance, such aggregate expenditure would remain completely unaltered if = 1, which would prevent convergence. That is true because the right hand side of (20) would be equal to one and lower than the left hand side.
Here we have provided a condition for convergence valid for the whole possible range of trade openness, and not only for the limiting case in which ! 1 . An interesting task would be exploring its robustness as well. For instance, we could try to see if either occupational choice or the existence of a stagnant (agricultural) sector would make convergence depend on the initial level of trade costs.
Some crucial historical events, like China's accession to the World Trade Organization, have brought the international distribution of production to the forefront of economic analysis. Therefore, economists have devoted much attention to the analysis of the product cycle in the context of free trade, exploring the e¤ects of new intellectual property rights or the incorporation of new countries to the global economy. However, the technical di¢ culty of the problem often prevented the analysis of product cycles with costly trade. Here we tried to o¤er a …rst step in that direction by looking for international convergence implications over the steady state. Our main contribution to such debate is a novel, closed-form condition for convergence in response to freer trade, at any level of initial trade openness.
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Let us denote by n and s the operating pro…ts of any Northern and Southern …rm, respectively.
At every period ', a representative household from location k owns a mass nk (') and sk (') of Southern …rms, respectively. Moreover, f nk (') stands for the share of gross savings devoted to buying Northern equity. We will explore now the properties of an interior equilibrium in which all consumers …nance new startups in both countries (i.e. 0 < f nk < 1).
Our control variables will be E k (our household's expenditure) and f nk , whereas the state variables are nk and sk . Then, the present value Hamiltonian faced at time t by any household for the period ' can be speci…ed as follows:
The …rst order condition corresponding to an interior solution for f nk (0 < f nk < 1) is the following one:
By di¤erentiating in (23) and using the …rst order conditions with respect to the state variables, we can conclude that
The last expression shows how the pro…tability of Northern and Southern …rms must satisfy a non arbitrage condition period by period. That condition immediately makes both local expenditure levels grow at the same rate. In turn, such an identical growth rate in local expenditures immediately requires a permanent trade balance, since otherwise no country would repay their debt while spending permanently as fast as the rest of the world.
Details on the derivation of our system of di¤erential equations
Northern and Southern expenditure shares
Taking into account the demand function for every Northern variety, after some algebraic transformations we can obtain from (5) and (6) that
Let us now rearrange the last expression to get that
Similarly, we can derive that
Using simultaneously our equations (25) and (26), we can …nally conclude that
Non-arbitrage conditions
Since all …rms from both countries will be able to quote the unconstrained markup, per period operating pro…ts for any manufacturing …rm in location k are
Therefore, we can develop the expression (7) by using (4), (7) and (27) as follows:
n n x n = ba n 1 +2 + 2 q + 1
And then we are ready to obtain that
As a result, from (7), (29) and (30), we can derive the …rst of our three di¤erential equations:
And …nally,
It is possible to conduct a very similar analysis with respect to our second endogenous variable c, which results in the following di¤erential equation:
Dealing with our labor market clearing conditions, we can also derive the last di¤erential equation of our dynamical system:
Proof of Lemma 2.
Assume that q < 1. We are going to prove that then, necessarily, is increasing in when q < 1 . Therefore, the maximum value that q+ 1+ q can take is one, which implies that our left-hand side is equal to q < 1 and hence the equality above implies that
Assume now that
We are going to show that then, necessarily, q < 1. If q 1, then our factor q+ 1+ q is decreasing in and, therefore, the minimum value it can take is one. As a result, our left hand side will be q 1 , which contradicts our initial equality. Therefore, our conclusion is that q < 1 if and only if
We can proceed in an analogous way to prove the second inequality.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Our starting point is
Let us …rst di¤erentiate with respect to the expression q+ 1+ q . If we denote by
Then, from (17), (35) and ( 
where (1 + q) (q + ) q 1
2
(1 + q) (q + ) + q 1 2 > 0
Then, we can see from (37) and (38) that ! R > 0 i¤ q < 1. In terms of the parameters, ! R > 0 i¤ (20) holds.
